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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the STATE OF UTAH 
STANFORD B. PETERSEN and CAROL 
A. PETERSEN, his wife 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
VS. 
lNTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORPOR-
ATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
D. SPENCER NILSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANFORD B. PETERSEN, et. al., 
Defendant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
12984 
This is an action for breach of an agreement to loan 
$20,000 within one year from the date of the agreement 
which was consolidated with an action between the same 
parties for foreclosure of a note and mortgage. This latter 
action was treated as a counterclaim. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The lower court dismissed the action for breach upon 
its merits based upon findings and conclusions that specific 
2 
performance had beep_ waived, that performance was 
prevented and that the parties had entered an accord and 
satisfaction. The court further awarded a decree foreclos. 
ing the note and mortgage. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The judgment dismissing the action for breach should 
be reversed with instructions to determine the amount of 
damages resulting from the breach and offsetting the 
amount due under the note and mortgage. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 22, 1966 the plaintiffs, Stanford B. Peter-
sen and Carol A. Petersen (hereinafter called Petersen), 
entered into a written agreement (Exh. 8-P) with defend-
ant, Intermountain Capital Corporation (hereinafter 
called ICC), under which Petersen exchanged his interest 
in a motel for certain property located in Casper, Wyo-
ming (hereinafter called the Wyoming property) and 
$30,000.00. The agreement further provided that ICC was 
to loan Petersen $20,000 within one year from the date of 
the agreement, the time within that year to be determined 
by ICC, to be repaid in three annual installments with 
nine percent interest and to be secured by a mortgage on 
the Wyoming property. (Para. 5, Exh. 8-P). The agreement 
also provided that time was "of the essence of this agree· 
ment" and that it "may not be altered or amended except 
by written agreement executed by all of the parties." 
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Petersen was in need of money during the entire year 
of the agreement and thereafter and John Whiteley, the 
president and manager of ICC, knew of his need for 
money (R. 43-44, 69, 71). The purpose of this loan provision 
in the agreement was to take care of some pressing finan-
cial obligations of Petersen (R. 43-44). Petersen contacted 
·whiteley several times during the year and regularly 
after the year expired to obtain the funds ICC had agreed 
to loan. Each time Whiteley responded that they didn't 
have the funds to make the loan. Finally, on April 5, 1967, 
a formal demand letter (Exh. 9-P) was sent to ICC by 
Petersen's attorney threatening legal action if the loan 
was not made. After receiving the letter Whiteley went 
to Petersen's home and again said he couldn't make the 
loan because he didn't have the money. (R. 48). 
Petersen had already lost a dairy equipment business 
because of his lack of funds (R. 49) and had numerous 
obligations to meet in connection with that business. He 
had previously, in October of 1966, contracted to sell the 
Wyoming property to James S. Milliron for $67,200.00 
unrler a Uniform Real Estate Contract containing the 
standard provision allowing the Seller to "secure, execute 
and maintain loans secured by said property of not to 
exceed the then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bear-
interest at the rate of not to exceed six percent." The 
balance due on the contract was $50,200.00 and it would 
have had a balance far in excess of the $20,000.00 that ICC 
was to loan. Therefore, there was still adequate security 
for the loan. Milliron, the Buyer under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, knew of Petersen's need to mortgage the 
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property to ICC and had no objection thereto (R. 49 65). 
Because of Petersen's immediate need for funds and ICC's 
failure to loan it to him as agreed, he approached Milliron 
about paying the contract off in cash for a discount. An 
agreement was signed by Petersen and Milliron on May 5, 
1967 by which the $50,200.00 balance on the contract was 
discounted to $30,900.00 cash. With these funds Petersen 
was able to pay his pressing obligations but he suffered a 
loss of $19,300.00 in order to do so. Had ICC honored the 
agreement to loan $20,000.00, Petersen would not have 
discounted this contract (R. 60) and he would have mort-
gaged the Wyoming property to ICC in spite of the con-
tract to Milliron (R. 67). 
On May 12, 1967, soon after discounting this contract 
to Milliron, Petersen went to see Whiteley again. \Vhiteley 
then agreed to have ICC lend $5000.00 to Petersen to be 
secured by a mortgage on a home on Camino Way in Salt 
Lake City. No request was made that the Wyoming prop-
erty be used as security for this loan. (R. 59, 62-63). At the 
time of this loan Petersen requested that ICC make the 
loan of the entire $20,000.00 but Whiteley again refused. 
Several times following the $5,000.00 loan, Petersen asked 
Whiteley about the additional $15,000.00. Each time 
Whiteley said he needed more time to get the other 
$15,000.00 (R. 63, 72-73). 
The $5,000.00 loan was due in 60 days but was not 
paid. ICC didn't ask for any payment because Whiteley 
realized they had been slow in loaning the money. Much 
later ICC's auditor sent a request to Petersen to confirm 
the balance due on the loan. Petersen responded that he 
felt he had been damaged by ICC's breach and that the 
Joa;1 would bl'.! offset against the damages suffered. No 
:1.'urther action was taken until July 3, 1969 when Petersen 
ff!ed this action for breach of the agreement of January 
22,. 1966. IGC answered the complaint and on August 20, 
1971 assigned its $5,000.00 note and mortgage to D. 
Spencer Nilson. Nilson commenced a foreclosure action on 
December 20, 1971. Petersen filed an Answer and Counter-
claim asserting that Nilson was not a holder in due course 
and was therefore subject to all defenses and claims 
against ICC and asking that the two actions be consoli-
dated for trial. The lower court ordered the cases to be 
consolidated for trial and at the trial ICC and Nilson 
admitted that Nilson was not a holder in due course and 
that the case could be handled as a claim and counter-
claim between Petersen and ICC (R. 35, 41-42). At the trial 
there was substantial evidence of loss to Petersen. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE LOAN OF $5,000.00 BY ICC TO PETERSEN ON 
MAY 12, 1967 WAS AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
ICC has claimed in this action that the $5,000.00 loan 
was an accord and satisfaction with respect to its original 
obligation to loan $20,000.00. Yet, the phrase "accord and 
satisfaction" was never used by the parties at any time. 
It is important, therefore, to determine the definition of 
6 
the phrase. This court, in Browning v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc. of the U.S., 94 Utah 532, 72 P. 2d 1060 
(1937), reh. den .. 94 Utah 570, 80 P. 2d 348 (1938), has stated 
at 1068: 
An accord is an agreement between parties, 
one to give or perform, the other to receive or ac-
cept, such agreed payment or performance in satis-
faction of a claim. The "satisfaction" is the con-
sumation of such agreement. There must be 
consideration for the agreement. Settlement of an 
unliquidated or disputed claim where the parties 
are apart in good faith presents such consideration. 
Where the claim is definite and no dispute but an 
admittance of its owing, the agreement to take. a 
lesser amount even followed by satisfaction is not 
good unless attended by some consideration. In 
this case we do not see the elements· of an accord 
and satisfaction. True, there was a claim. It was 
filed and paid in accordance with demand with no 
dispute. If a doctor sends me a bill for $20.00 when 
it should have been $30.00 and I pay it, it is not an 
accord and satisfaction. It is merely a payment of 
less than I owe. 
In this case there is no evidence of an agreement (that 
is-offer, acceptance and consideration) between ICC and 
Petersen to perform and accept anything different from 
their original agreement. There was no written agree-
ment to accept the $5,000.00 loan in complete satisfaction 
of the obligation to lend $20,000.00. In fact the only testi-
mony in the record indicates a positive intention of both 
parties that the original $20,000.00 was to be made in the 
future. Petersen's testimony on cross-examination was as 
follows from Page 63 of the record: 
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"Q At the time of the $5,000.00 loan did you not ask 
him about the other $15,000.00? 
A. I asked him about the whole $20,000.00. I says, 
'Can you loan me the $20,000.00?' And he says, 
'No.' 
Q. All right. So he came up with $5,000.00, is that 
correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And did you ask him about the additional fif-
teen periodically after that? 
A. You say I asked him about the fifteen? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, about a month later I asked him if he could 
still come up with the $20,000.00." 
Whiteley's testimony on direct examination was as fol-
lows from Pages 71-73 of the record: 
"A. After April 5th. We sat in his dining room and 
discussed. this, and he was very nice about this, 
and he said, •you have got to get me something 
just about as fast as you can and I need it badly, 
and this is why I have gone to the attorney.' 
And I said, 'What is the least that you could 
get by with until we can do something better?' 
And he said, 1Well, I really need $5,000.00.' 
And I said, 'Then we will see that you get at 
least $5,000.00. Give me a few days to work on 
it and we will certainly come up with that much.' 
Q. And did you? 
A. We did. 
Q. Did he say anything about this would solve his 
problem? 
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A. He indicatt~d at his home a day or two after we 
got the letter that the $5,000.00 would solve his 
problem at that time, and that we could take 
more time on the balance. Then when we gave 
him the check he said, 'Thanks, you have saved 
my life.' 
Q. This was on May 12th'? 
A. Right. 
Q. 1967? Were there other conversations after that 
time with Mr. Petersen concerning trying to 
get another $15,000.00 for him'? 
A. Yes, several times. I would get him on the 
phone or he would drop into the office, or he had 
a travel agency on Second South, I would drop 
in there to talk to him, and he would say, 'Are 
you ready on the other $15,000.00?' 
Q. All right. And what would you respond? 
A. And I said, 'Well, we would· like a little more 
time. We are trying to get you that money and 
will if we can.' 
And he said, 'Fine. Let me know when you can.' " 
This is the only evidence in the record bearing 
on the question of accord and satisfaction. "What is the 
least that you could get by with until we can do something 
better" and "we could take more time on the balance" 
certainly negates any claim of accord and satisfaction. 
And the repeated inquiries concerning the other $15,000.00 
and requests for "a little more time" recognizes that the 
original obligation was still considered binding by both 
parties. Furthermore, no consideration was given by ICC 
9 
to support a new agreement and there was no dispute 
about the amount or terms of the obligation the settle-
ment of which would constitute consideration. Therefore, 
neither the facts nor the law support a finding of accord 
and satisfaction. 
This case is similar to Bennett v. Robinson's Medical 
Afart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P. 2d 761 (1966), where this 
court held that acceptance of a check marked "payment in 
full of the account stated below" was not an accord and 
satisfaction. The court stated at 764: 
"Plaintiff testified that upon receipt of the check 
he went to the Defendants and discussed the mat-
ter, telling them that he did not regard it as pay-
ment in full and the dispute between the parties 
over the matter is what precipitated this lawsuit. 
He was unquestionably entitled to the money he 
did receive; and the dispute was as to whether he 
had more coming. The dispute negates any accord .... " 
Likewise, Petersen accepted the $5,000.00 loan, although 
there was no indication that it was "payment in full." The 
conversations between Petersen and Whiteley show that 
both of them recognized that the original agreement was 
still to be performe<l. The failure to perform that agree-
ment caused the filing of this lawsuit by Petersen. He was 
unquestionably entitled to the $5,000.00 loan he received 
(though he was entitled to more favorable terms); the law-
suit was as to whether he had more coming or damages in 
lieu thereof. This, too, negates any accord. Also of rele-
vance is the fact that the original agreement could not be 
"altered or amended except by written agreement." There 
10 
was no written alteration or amendment and therefore the 
original agreement was still in effect. The lower court's 
determination that there was an accord and satisfaction 
was therefore in error. 
II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE AGREEMENT OF 
JANUARY 22, 1966, WAS "WAIVED AND/OR EX-
TENDED" BY THE ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES. 
Waiver is usually defined as the voluntary relinquish-
ment of a known right. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY, at 
1752 (4th ed. 1951). There is no evidence in the record indi-
cating that Petersen voluntarily, or otherwise, relin-
quished his right to the $20,000.00 loan. Indeed, his 
repeated demands, both during and after the year 
expired, that the loan be made evidence the contrary 
intention. (R. 46-47, 69, 70). There is no indication any-
where in the record that Petersen was waiving his rights 
or extending the date for performance. The agreement 
provided expressly that time was "of the essence of this 
agreement". Performance by January 22, 1967 was critical 
to Petersen because of the pressing nature of his financial 
obligations and this fact was known to and admitted by 
Whiteley. All of these facts support only the conclusion 
that Petersen at all times insisted on full and timely per-
formance and none of them support even an inference of 
waiver or extension by Petersen. The later conversations 
between Petersen and Whiteley quoted in Point I above 
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also show that full performance was expected by both 
parties even after the breach. Again the requirement that 
any alterations or amendments to the agreement be in 
writing would preclude any waiver or extension of specific 
performance except by a new written agreement. It fol-
lows that the lower court's conclusion that specific perfor-
mance was waived or extended was without support in the 
record and therefore in error. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PETERSEN PREVENTED ICC FROM PERFORMING 
THE AGREEMENT TO LOAN $20,000.00 by JANUARY 
22, 1967 Bl CONTRACTING TO SELL THE WYOMING 
PROPERTY TO JAMES S. MILLIRON IN OCTOBER, 
1966. 
Because of Petersen's pressing need for funds during 
1966 and because of the loss he had suffered on the Wyo-
ming property he purchased from ICC (R. 55-57), Petersen 
executed a Uniform Real Estate Contract with James S. 
Milliron, in October, 1966, under which he agreed to sell 
the Wyoming property to Milliron for $67,200.00 with the 
balance, after down payment, of $50,200.00 payable in 
annual installments over 25 years. No title to the property 
was conveyed to Milliron. Petersen was only obligated to 
convey title after the contract was paid in full which 
would have taken 25 years. ICC's contention is that, as a 
matter of law, this contract sale of the Wyoming property 
prevented ICC from loaning the $20,000.00 to Petersen 
since the $20,000.00 loan was to be secured by a mortgage 
12 
on the Wyoming property. Without any evidence, other 
than the contract itself (Exh. 4-D), the lower court found 
that Petersen had thereby prevented ICC from perform-
ing its agreement to loan the $20,000.00. 
The contract sale to Milliron, of course, did not pre-
vent ICC from making the loan to Petersen. Neither 
Whiteley nor anyone else connected with ICC even knew 
about the sale to Milliron (R. 70) and this obviously did not 
prevent his performance. The implication by the lower 
court is that the contract sale to Milliron made the Wyo-
ming property unavailable as security for the loan to be 
made by ICC. Assuming this to be true, arguendo, Peter-
sen might have provided other security for the loan which 
would have satisfied ICC. Whiteley testified that he would 
have considered other security for the loan and then dis-
played an amazing lack of candor when asked if he would 
have accepted better security than the Wyoming property. 
His response was, "I doubt it." (R. 74). It is obvious from 
the testimony of both parties and from the purpose of the 
original agreement that the loan of $20,000.00 to Petersen 
was the essence of the agreement while the security for 
the loan was not. In fact ICC did accept other security for 
the $5,000.00 loan when it "partially" performed and made 
no request that the Wyoming property be used as security. 
(R. 59) 
Had Whiteley told Petersen that he had the $20,000.00 
and would make the loan as agreed, any problem in ob· 
taining the Wyoming property as security would have 
been revealed. If other acceptable security could not be 
obtained, then Petersen would have had the burden of 
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clearing up the problem on the Wyoming property. Still 
assuming that the contract sale to Milliron made the prop-
erty unavailable as security, Petersen could have requested 
Milliron to make the property available for this purpose. 
The testimony shows that Milliron knew of this need and 
had already agreed to it (R. 49, 65). Petersen could have 
gone further and repurchased the property from Miiliron 
or given him some consideration to make the property 
avaiiable as security for the loan from ICC. The point is 
that this was Petersen's problem (which he had already 
3ol \'ed) and had nothing whatsoever to do with the obliga-
tion of I CC. In no conceivable way did this prevent per-
formance by ICC. Whiteley explained that ICC's failure 
to perform was only due to its own inability or perhaps, if 
he was not can<lirl on this point too, its own unwillingness 
and refusal to perform. 
The above arguments assume that the contract sale 
to Milliron made the Wyo ming property unavailable as 
security. The fact is, however, that this contract sale in no 
way prevented Petersen from mortgaging the property 
to I CC. Title to the property was still in Petersen and 
would not have been conveyed to Milliron for 25 years 
when the contract was paid in full. The contract contained 
the standard clause giving Petersen the "option to secure, 
execute and maintain loans secured by said property of 
not to exceed the then unpaid contract balance here-
under," which was $50,200.00, well in excess of the con-
templated $20,000 loan. It is common practice under these 
Uniform Real Estate Contracts for the seller to mortgage 
I 
the property sold to banks or other lenders to leverage 
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already making under the contract and his interest rate 
would be no greater than he already agreed to pay. That 
purpose doesn't apply in this case since the contemplated 
mortgage to ICC would be paid off long before the con-
tract (3 years as opposed to 25 years). Furthermore, should 
Milliron decide to payoff his contract and demand a deed 
prior to the time Petersen had repaid the mortgage to 
ICC, a portion of the repayment could be applied by Peter-
sen to ICC's loan in order to obtain a release of the mort-
gage and convey clear title to Milliron. 
ICC's argument also overlooks the fact that Petersen 
could have mortgaged the Wyoming property to ICC even 
if this caused him to breach his contract with Milliron. 
That, again, is a problem only for Petersen, which he may 
or may not be able to resolve with Milliron. In this case he 
had already resolved that matter with Milliron. But, had 
Petersen not resolved it, Milliron's remedy against Peter-
sen would have been suit for breach of a covenant of their 
contract and for damages suffered, if any. That matter 
between Milliron and Petersen and the consequences to 
Petersen, could have no consequence to ICC. Even assum-
ing Petersen could be required by Milliron to obtain a 
release of the mortgage to ICC, that could only work to 
the advantage of ICC in getting its loan paid off since it 
could refuse to release its mortgage until it was paid in 
full. The fact that the performance by A an agreement 
with B causes a breach of a separate agreement between 
A and C does not prevent the performance of the first 
agreement by A. Further, it does not excuse performance 
of the first agreement by B. This is certainly the case 
where, as here, the ;:,greemen ~ between A and C was mad1 
subsequently to the agreement between A and B. It i: 
true that some case.:; hold that a contract which is enterer 
fm: the purpose of effecting a breach of a prior inconsis1· 
ent contract is void and unenforceable by either parts 
However, all of these were entered with knowledge of th1 
prior inconsistent contract and for the purpose of causini 
a breach thereof. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts Par. 187; Anno 
tation, 83 A.L.R. 32. These cases are not authority fo 
invalidity of the first agreement. As applied to this casi 
if applicable at all, these authorities support the invalidit) 
of the later contract oetween Petersen and Milliron sinci 
that agreement, so ICC argues, causes the breach of th1 
prior inconsistent agreement. Therefore, the Milliror 
agreement is void and presents no obstacle to the per 
formance of the Petersen-ICC agreement. No authoritiei 
have been found, nor could they find any support in logic 
which hold the prior agreement unenforceable by reasor 
of the later inconsistent agreement. 
The Wyoming property was available as security fo1 
a loan from ICC at all times during the year specified ir 
the agreement and thereafter until it was obvious that 
ICC was not going to perform. Title to the Property wa: 
not conveyed until May 5, 1967, one month after Whitele) 
had refused to make the loan in response to the demani 
from Petersen's attorney. The contract sale to Milliror 
still left $50,200.00 equity in the property to secure ! 
$20,000.00 loan. ICC had available all the security it needei 
and bargained for. It was not "prevented" or excuse! 
from performance by the contract sale to Milliron and tbi 
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lowe1· court's holding to thif; effect should be re\'ersed. 
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE CONCLUDED 
THAT ICC BREACHED ITS AGREEMENT TO LOAN 
$20,000.00 TO PETERSEN BY JANUARY 22, 1967, OR 
THEREAFTER, AND SHOULD HAVE AWARDED THE 
RESULTING DAMAGES. 
The Lower Court dismissed Petersen's complaint for 
;Jreach of the agreement to loan $20,000.00 to Petersen 
apparently on the basis of its determination that the 
$5,000.00 loan was an accord and satisfaction, that specific 
performance had been waived or extended and that Peter-
sen "prevented" ICC from performing. Points I, II and III 
above show that the court was in error in making these 
determinations and therefore its dismissal of Petersen's 
complaint has no basis. 
The facts necessary to establish Petersen's cause of 
action are clearly admitted in ICC's Answer and in the 
evidence. 'l'he agreement of ICC to loan $20,000.00 to Pet-
ersen by January 22, 1967 and the failure to perform that 
agreement are admitted in the Answer (R. 3). The evi-
rlence of both parties shows a breach of the contract. 
Petersen introduced substantial evidence of loss and 
damage to him directly resulting from ICC's breach of 
the agreement. ICC produced nothing to controvert any 
of this. The evidence shows direct cash losses of $19,300.00 
from the necessity to discount thn Milliron contract to 
raise cash and of $10,000.00 from loss of Petersen's dairy 
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equipment business. Tht: evidence and exhibits further 
showed damage to Petersen's credit for which further 
amounts should be awarded. Of course, the $5,000 loan by 
ICC to Petersen should be offaet against these damages 
and the balance awar<lf'd to Petersen as net damages 
resulting from breach of the agreement by ICC. Since this 
evidence is before this court, the order reversing the lower 
court's judgment should include directions to award 
damages in accordance with the above evidence. 
It should ~e pointed out that Petersen had already 
suffered his damages prior to May 12, 1967 when the 
$5,000.00 loan was made. A loan of $20,000.00 by January 
22, 1967 would have prevented these damages. The evi-
dence and exhibits indicate that the weeks following 
January 22, 1967 were the most difficult for Petersen. 
Finally, in hopes of pressuring ICC into performing its 
agreement to help Petersen out of his financial difficulty, 
he had his attorney send a demand letter to ICC on April 
5, 1967. This produced an immediate reaction from 
Whiteley but no loan and no promise of a loan in the ne~r 
future. The funds still were not available, according to 
Whiteley. It was obvious to Petersen that ICC was not 
going to perform its agreement. He had heard that same 
story from Whiteley for a year. He had no choice but to 
find some other means out of his difficulty and the dis· 
count of the contract to Milliron for cash, and the conse-
quent loss to him, was the only means available to him. 
Whiteley's belated decision to loan $5,000.00 to Petersen 
on May 12, 1967, after Petersen's loss had occured, was 
too little and too late to prevent the consequences of his 
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breach. HP,, of course, admitted having knowledge of 
Petersen's desperate financial situation and could there-
fore have foreseen the consequences of his breach. In view 
of all this Petersen \Vas certainly justified in withhholding 
repayment of the $5,000.00 loan until ICC had responded 
for the damages which it caused. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court made several findings of fact that 
find no support in the evidence. Many of the conclusions 
of law find no support in the findings of fact. All of these 
were challenged by Petersen in his motion to amend the 
findings and conclusions. The lower court summarily 
refused to make any amendments even though a cursory 
reading of the transcript shows the obvious error in the 
findings and conclusions. This brief has considered only 
those errors considered most detrimental and basic to the 
judgment of the lower court. 
The record contains no evidence supporting the con-
clusion that an accord was agreed to by Petersen and ICC. 
There was no off er, no acceptance and no consideration. 
An accord is a new agreement which must contain all the 
basic elements necessary to support a contract. None of 
that appears here and in fact all the evidence shows that 
both parties were looking to the original agreement even 
after the alleged accord and satisfaction took place. Much 
of the same evidence clearly establishes that there was no 
voluntary, or otherwise, relinquishment of a known right 
by Petersen. Therefore, there could be no waiver or exten-
sion of specific performance of the agreement. Since the 
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agreement expressly provided that alterations or amend. 
ments must be in writing, the alleged accord and satisfac. 
tion and waiver or extension would be of no effect anyway. 
Further, the contract sale by Petersen to Milliron in no 
way prevented Petersen from using the Wyoming prop-
erty as security for the loan from I CC. Petersen still had 
title to the property, his agreement with Milliron allowed 
such a mortgage, Milliron was aware of and had consented 
to the mortgage, and even a breach of that contract by 
Petersen would not prevent Petersen from mortgaging 
the property to ICC. This in no way excused performance 
by ICC. Whiteley's own testimony proves that his failure 
to perform was either ICC's inability or unwillingness to 
perform and was not related to any action of Petersen. 
ICC had the burden of proof on all of these matters and 
has failed to carry that burden. Therefore, the lower 
court's judgment should be reversed with directions to 
enter judgment in favor of Petersen and award damages 
in accordance with the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK 
By: 
Ralph J. Marsh 
